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1. Introduction
The maritime transport of nuclear materials has created a conflict between two
international law regimes: the United Nations International Law of the Sea1 (UNCLOS), and the
developing customary law of the “precautionary principle” in international environmental law.
This conflict became apparent in recent years when several coastal states denied passage to ships
transporting nuclear materials arguing the shipments posed an environmental threat.

This

conflict has raised an issue which is currently unresolved: Do coastal states have a right to
prohibit innocent passage to ships carrying nuclear materials if these ships fail to fulfill the
requirements of the precautionary principle?
This paper will begin by examining the legitimate concerns of both shipping and coastal
states by describing several of the recent controversies in the transnational shipment of nuclear
materials leading to the current international legal dispute.

Part Three will discuss the

international legal basis for the precautionary principle and its several manifestations in both
hard and soft law documents. The safeguards regime for ocean shipments of nuclear materials
will be explored in Part Four. Part Five will explore the provisions of UNCLOS relating to
innocent passage and environmental protection to decipher whether coastal States have a right to
deny innocent passage to shipments of nuclear materials, and if so when. Lastly, Part Six will
discuss several recommendations of how best to resolve this real and doctrinal conflict between
states shipping nuclear materials and coastal states denying passage. The paper concludes by

1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered
into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (last visited Nov.
25, 2005).
1

finding the current nuclear safeguard regime does not require shipping states to provide notice to
or authorization from transit states, therefore coastal states have no legal basis to deny innocent
passage. This safeguard regime, however, is evolving and may adopt a precautionary approach
in the future.
2. Recent Controversies in Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Material
The transnational shipment of nuclear materials by sea has encountered much resistance
from coastal states and environmental organizations over the past decade. The controversy
began in 1992 when Japan, France and England began conducting secret shipments of large
quantities of nuclear material.2 Once news of these shipments was leaked to the public, many
coastal states along possible shipping routes protested the possibility of nuclear materials passing
through their coastal waters without their knowledge or approval. Some states refused these
shipments the right of innocent passage through their territorial waters; seemingly in violation of
UNCLOS.3 A few states even prohibited the passage of these ships through their Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs), an area extending 200 miles off of their shores.4 These coastal states
have claimed a right to deny innocent passage because the existing safeguards regime for ocean
shipments of nuclear material do not comply with the requirements of the “precautionary
principle,” a relatively recent doctrine of international environmental law.5
These controversies are not merely the result of the conflicting international law doctrines
of innocent passage and the precautionary principle, but are in essence conflicting views of
2

See Jon M. Van Dyke, Sea Transport of Japanese Plutonium Under International Law, 24
Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 399, 399-400 (1993).
3
See infra Part Five.
4
See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 57.
5
See infra Part Three
2

national security of shipping and coastal states. The shipping states have a security interest in
maintaining secrecy for shipments of nuclear materials and have codified these concerns in
international agreements.6 If the itineraries of these shipments were to be publicized, they fear
the ships would be more susceptible to terrorist or pirate attack; potentially allowing nuclear
materials to get onto the black market and/or be used in making a “dirty bomb,” or that they
could be victim to a U.S.S Cole type terrorist attack.7 On the other hand, coastal states have
security interests based on environmental concerns which have also been recognized in
international agreements.8 An attack, wreck or sinking of a ship carrying nuclear material in a
coastal state’s waters could have catastrophic effects on their coastal environment and industries;

6

See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Oct. 28, 1979, art 6, 18 I.L.M.
1419 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1987) [hereinafter Physical Protection Convention] available at
http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml (last visited Nov. 22,
2005); See also Information Circular, International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities, secs. 8.1.2(f), 8.1.3, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (1998) [hereinafter IAEA Information Circular 225] available
at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
7
See Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6(2); IAEA Information Circular 225,
supra note 5, at sec. 8.1.1 & 8.1.2.
8
See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, arts. 4(2)(f)&(h), UNEP Doc. I G.80/3 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 657
(1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]; Bamako Convention on the Ban of The Import Into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan.
30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991) [hereinafter Bamako Convention] available at
http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/en/treaties/treaties_fulltext.php?docnr=3025&language=en (last
visited on Nov. 11, 2005); Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of
Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within the South Pacific Region, Waigani, Sept. 16, 1995,
2001 Austl. T.S. No. 17 [hereinafter Waigani Convention] available at
http://www.ban.org/Library/waigani_treaty.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2005); Information
Circular, International Atomic Energy Agency, Code of Practice on the International
Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, sec. 3, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/386 (1990)
available at http://www.globelaw.com/Nukes/iaeacod.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
3

potentially devastating their economy, largely based on coastal resources, and crippling the
health and welfare of its people.9
In order to demonstrate the context of this controversy, this section will provide a
summary of some of the most notorious events in the transnational shipments of nuclear material
by sea. In particular it will highlight nuclear shipments where coastal states have prohibited
innocent passage because of environmental concerns. It will also shed light on incidents where
problems in shipping of nuclear materials have given coastal states legitimate reason to have
safety concerns.
a. Prohibition of innocent passage
In 1992, the voyage of the Akatsuki Maru from France to Japan, carrying 1.7 tons of
plutonium, was the first large shipment of nuclear materials to meet substantial resistance from
coastal states.10 Despite the fact the route of the voyage was kept secret, many countries on the
potential route publicly prohibited the ship from taking a route through their waters, including
Argentina, Chile, Portugal, South Africa, and Malaysia.11 Furthermore, soon before the voyage
the Caribbean island nations adopted a Declaration on Shipments of Plutonium, banning passage

9

See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous
Radioactive Materials, 33 Oceans Dev. & Int’l L 77, 80 (2002) [hereinafter Van Dyke II].
10
Plutonium Shipment Leaves France for Japan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1992, at 3.
11
Id.; see also Ruth Youngblood, Japanese Secrecy over Plutonium Shipment Sparks Outcry,
United Press Int’l, Sept. 27, 1992; Lisbon Asks Tokyo to keep Akatsuki Maru Away, Kyodo News
Agency, Nov. 10, 1992.
4

of all shipments of nuclear materials through the Caribbean Sea and making the region a
“nuclear-free zone.”12
Despite the fact that Japan publicly stated the actions of these countries were contrary to
international law, the Akatsuki Maru nevertheless stayed outside the EEZs of all protesting states
except for a few Pacific island nations.13 The environmental organization Greenpeace also
organized large demonstrations at both the French and Japanese ports sparking violent clashes
between authorities and protesters. A Greenpeace ship also followed the Akatsuki Maru for
much of its voyage, and was at one point rammed by a Japanese patrol boat.14 After this voyage,
the Japanese announced that they planned to ship at least another 30 tons of plutonium in the
coming years.15
In 1995, the British vessel Pacific Pintail met even more dramatic protest before its
voyage from France to Japan carrying 28 logs of high-level vitrified nuclear waste in glass
blocks.16 Along with the Caribbean states who had already established a nuclear free-policy,
Antigua, Barbuda, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Uruguay refused to
allow the shipment through their territorial waters.17 Furthermore, Brazil, Argentina, Chile,

12

See Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred Soons, Plutonium Shipments – A Supplement, 25 Ocean
Dev. & Int’l L. 419, 424-425 (1994) (citing CARICOM Press Release No. 89/1992).
13
See Plutonium Ship to Pass West of Hawaii, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Dec. 7, 1992, at 1, col. 1;
Colin Nickerson, Japan’s Plutonium Ship Ends Voyage, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1993, at 1.
14
Id.; see also Andrew Bell, Greenpeace Vessel Hit by Japanese, The Guardian (London), Nov.
9, 1992, at 7.
15
Id.
16
Denholm Bartenson, Nuclear Waste Shipment Leaves France, United Press Int’l [Paris], Feb.
23, 995.
17
Id.
5

South Africa, Nauru and Kiribati expressly prohibited the ship’s passage through their EEZs.18
Due to the protest of the Latin American and Caribbean states, the Pacific Pintail abandoned its
preferred route through the Panama Canal and charted a course around Cape Horn to avoid the
waters of protesting states.19
When passing Cape Horn, however, 30 foot seas and 60 mile-per-hour winds forced the
captain to find calmer waters within Chile’s EEZ.20 The Chilean Navy and Air Force had been
tracking the progress of the Pacific Pintail, and once it had entered Chile’s EEZ the Chilean
authorities demanded that the ship leave their waters immediately.21 A Chilean Navy frigate and
aircraft intercepted the ship and threatened it with military action if it did not change course.22
Once it became apparent that armed force was not prudent against a vessel carrying nuclear
waste, the frigate then threatened to interfere with the ship's navigation by throwing ropes into
the water to wrap around the its propeller.23 The captain of the Pacific Pintail conceded to the
demand and returned to the high seas despite the grave risk posed by the rough waters.24 When
addressing the legal principles for their actions against the Pacific Pintail, the Chilean Maritime
18

See Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of
Radioactive Materials, 27 Ocean & Int’l L. 379, 380-83 (1996) [hereinafter Van Dyke I].
19
Atomic Ship Breaks Ban, Enters Brazil Waters – Greenpeace, Reuters News Service, Mar. 6,
1995; Plutonium Ship Will Not Go Through Panama Canal, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mar. 6,
1995.
20
Nuclear Ship Braves Stormy Seas, Defies Chile Ban, Reuters News Service, Mar. 20, 1995.
21
Helen R. McLeod, UK Could Be Liable If Chile Takes Warlike Action vs. Ship, Journal of
Commerce, Mar. 21, 1995, at 7A.
22
A. Suva, Nuclear Ship Chase - Chilean Navy Forces Pintail Out of Waters, Hobart Mercury,
Mar. 22, 1995. The article cites a transcript of the radio exchange between the Chilean frigate
and the captain of the Pacific Pintail:
Chilean Frigate: Pacific Pintail, you could be "exposed to the use of weapons against you
from navy vessels or air [planes] of the Chilean Navy."
Pacific Pintail: "I hear your message and with the nature of our cargo I would not think
that is a very sensible thing to do, to use arms . . ." Id.
23
Id.; See also N-Waste Ship Forced Out of Chile's Waters, The Advertiser, Mar. 22, 1995.
24
Id.
6

Authority cited the precautionary principle and declared that the duty to protect the marine
environment took precedence over the right of innocent passage.25
b. Legitimate safety concerns of coastal states
Despite the fact that the practice of transnational shipment of nuclear materials by sea has
never resulted in an accident or incident with radiological consequences causing serious harm to
the environment,26 there is evidence that coastal states have legitimate safety concern from these
shipments. Three incidents in particular have put into question the safety of these shipments,
including: 1.) the lack of response of shipping states to the sinking of a vessel containing nuclear
material; 2.) the unauthorized boarding of a ship containing nuclear material; and 3.) the
falsification of safety records of a shipment of nuclear.
i. Responses to sinking
In 1997, the MSC Carla, a 25 year old Panamanian-flag cargo vessel, on a voyage from
France to the United States broke-in-two in 30 foot seas 70 nautical miles off the coast of the
Azores.27 The forepart of the ship sank to a depth of 3,000 meters carrying 11 tons of cesium,
having a total radioactivity of 330 terabecquerels.28 As a comparison, the Chernobyl explosion

25

See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 387 (citing Chilean Maritime Authority Resolution
12600/76 of Mar. 16, 1995).
26
See Raul A.F. Pedrozo, Transport of Nuclear Cargoes by Sea, 28 J. Mar. L. Com. 207, 236
(1997).
27
Radioactive Materials – cesium-137 – on broken ship in Atlantic, Reuters News Agency, Dec.
1, 1997.
28
G. Sert, The Recovery Radioactive Sources after a Shipwreck: The Case of the Mont-Louis
Cargo and the Implications of the M.S.C. Carla, 3-5 (presented at the 42nd Regular Session of the
IAEA General Conference in Sept. 1998) [hereinafter Sert] available at
http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/About/GC/GC42/sciprog/gc42-scifor-8.pdf (last visited on Nov.
11, 2005); See also IAEA, Inventory of Accidents and Losses at Sea Involving Radioactive
7

released 4,800 terabecquerels of cesium into the atmosphere.29 Nether the French or the US
attempted to salvage these materials because of their depth, and because it was determined the
potential for damage from a radiation leak was “negligible.”30 The United Kingdom’s Ministry
of the Environment stated that though corrosion of the stainless steal cylinders containing the
cesium will gradually wash the radioactive materials into the environment, because of the depth
the contamination would be “horizontal” and should not affect the commercial species of fish.31
ii. Boarding
In 1998, the British-flag vessel the Pacific Swan, sister ship to the Pacific Pintail, was
boarded by members of Greenpeace in the Panama Canal.32

In the darkness of the early

morning, activists pulled a boat along side of the vessel and used ropes to climb onto the bow.33
Once on board, they then hoisted a banner with the words “No Plutonium” from the mast and
chained themselves to the ship.34 At the time of the boarding the ship was carrying 30 tons of
Mix-Oxide fuel (MOX), having enough plutonium to make 60 nuclear bombs.35 Greenpeace

Material 20-21, Doc. No. IAEA-TECDOC-1243 (Sept., 2001) available at http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1242_prn.pdf (last visited on Nov. 11, 2005); see also
Press Release, Nuclear Information Service, Ship Sinks will 11 Tons of Cesium (Dec. 7, 1997)
[hereinafter Nuclear Information Service] available at http://www.nbase.org.uk/public/briefing/90_99/brief110.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
29
Press Release, Greenpeace, Ship Involved in Nuke Accident to be Towed to Spanish Port
(Dec. 19, 1997) available at http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-pressreleases/1997/msg00514.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
30
Sert, supra note 28, at 3.
31
Nuclear Information Service, supra note 28.
32
Press Release, Greenpeace, Nuclear Waste Shipment Enters Panama Canal Flying Greenpeace
Banner – Stop Plutonium! (Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Greenpeace] available at
http://archive.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/nuctrans/1998feb62.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
33
Kevin G Hall, Pana-Mayhem, J. of Comm., Mar. 6, 1998, at 1B [hereinafter Hall].
34
Id.
35
See Earl Lane, Activist: Atomic Waist to be Shipped, Newsday, Jan. 15, 1998, at A19; see also
Robert Whymant, Nuclear Fuel Arrives in Japan, The Times (London), Sept. 28, 1999.
8

stated the purpose of this demonstration was to protest the shipment of nuclear materials and to
raise awareness of the threat these shipments pose to the people and environment of Panama and
Central America.36

Despite its intent, the demonstration has proven that transboundary

shipments of nuclear materials by sea are vulnerable to pirate or terrorist attacks.37 One can only
imagine the devastation that could have occurred to the region if the boat which pulled along side
of the Pacific Swan was controlled by al Qa’ida terrorists, such as the boat used to attack the
U.S.S. Cole, instead of Greenpeace activists.
iii. Falsified safety inspection record
In 1999, it was revealed that British Nuclear Fuels (BNF), the company that owns five
nuclear transport ships including the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Swan, falsified cargo safety
inspection records on at least 10 lots of MOX containers being shipped to Japan.38 BNF
explained that the records were falsified in order to “save time.”39 After the questionable
shipment of MOX arrived in Japan, the Japanese authorities discovered the inconsistencies and
demanded the British to take the materials back.40 The MOX was then returned to the UK which
agreed to pay Japan 6.4 billion yen (approximately 60 million dollars) for damages incurred due
to the falsification.41 Now that shipping states have demonstrated that nuclear material safety
inspection records can be falsified, coastal states could be justified for refusing passage to these
36

Greenpeace, supra note 32.
Hall, supra note 33.
38
Inspectors Sent in as Sellafield Admits to Serious Safety Lapses, The Independent (London),
Sept. 14, 1999.
39
New Shipment of Nuclear Fuel to Leave France for Japan, Agency France Presse, Aug. 9,
2000.
40
Alan Cowell, Nuclear Plant in Britain Admits Sabotage, N.Y.Times, March 27, 2000, at A8,
col. 3 (nat'1 ed.).
41
Japan's Plutonium Policy and MOX Program Full of Contradictions, Nuke Info Tokyo,
Sept/Oct. 2000, at 1.
37

9

shipments for not having adequate assurances that nuclear materials on board have been properly
examined and authorized for shipping by competent inspectors.
3. The “Precautionary Principle” in International Law
Several scholars, most notably Jon Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii, claim that
customary international law includes a “precautionary principle” which is applicable to
shipments of nuclear materials.42 The precautionary principle is based on the maxim sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas (use what is yours so as not to harm what is others').43 Under the
precautionary principle, shipping states have a duty to take several steps before shipments of
nuclear materials may be undertaken.

These include, inter alia: the duty to prepare an

environmental impact assessment; duty to notify transit states of shipments in order for them to
prepare contingency plans in case of an accident or emergency; duty to consult with transit states
to jointly develop such contingency plans, and duty to mitigate all reasonably foreseeable
damages.44 This paper will for the most part limit its discussion of the precautionary principle to
the duty of notification for nuclear material shipping states and its implied or explicit subsidiary
right of transit states to either give or withhold prior authorization for these shipments after
notification.
Van Dyke asserts the precautionary principle allows transit states to require notification,
before such shipments can pass through their territorial seas or EEZs, and that these states can

42

See generally Van Dyke I, supra note 18; But see Eugene R. Fidell, Maritime Transport of
Plutonium and Spent Nuclear Fuel, 31 Int’l Law 757 (1997) [hereinafter Fidell].
43
See Jason L. Gudofsky, Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Waste for Recycling and
Recovery Operations, 34 Stan. J. Int’l L. 219, 222 (1998).
44
See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 380-83.
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suspend the right of innocent passage to these shipments.45 He further asserts that international
conventions and declarations, as well as the practice of states, provide evidence that the
precautionary principle is currently customary international law.46 Several states have indeed
adopted this principle into their laws, requiring either prior notification or prior authorization
before passage of ships carrying nuclear materials is permitted, or prohibiting their passage
altogether.47 Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the development of the precautionary principle
in order to understand its status under international law with relation to the right of innocent
passage.
a. Codification of the precautionary principle
i. Hard law: international and regional conventions
Though the origin of the precautionary principle can be traced to various international
agreements,48 including UNCLOS,49 the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of

45

See Id., at 384-85.
See Id., at 379; but see Fidell, supra note 42, at 757 et. seq.
47
Kari Hakapaa and Erik Jaap Molenaar, Innocent Passage-Past and Present, 23 Marine Policy
131, 142 (1999); see also Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 1, at 13 (July 1988) (7 countries requiring
prior notification: Canada, Djibouti, Libya, Malta, Pakistan, Portugal, and the United Arab
Emirates; 8 countries require prior authorization: Egypt, Guinea, Iran, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and Yemen; 6 country prohibit passage altogether: Argentina, Haiti, Ivory
Coast, Nigeria, The Philippines and Venezuela).
48
Some commentators have suggested that the precautionary principle was first formulated as a
concept in 1987 in the Declaration of the Second International North Sea Conference on the
Protection of the North Sea (London Convention). David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and
Development of the Precautionary Principle, in The Precautionary Principle in International
Law: The Challenge of Implementation 5 & n. 15 (David Freeston & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); see
also James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in
International Environmental Law, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 423 (1995). Others have suggested much
early origins dating back to the 1969 Oil Pollution Intervention Convention, and 1970
commercial whaling moratorium proposals. Philippe Sands, The “Greening” of International
Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 293, 298, 300-02 & n. 17
(1994).
46
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Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention) has
never the less been generally recognized as the first international convention codifying the
precautionary principle for the prevention of pollution.50 The Basel Convention provides state
parties with a basis for denial of passage of hazardous waste shipments if there has not been
notification provided by the shipping state and prior authorization for the shipment by transit
states.51 Van Dyke cites the Basel Convention as the primary basis for states to be able to
require notification and prior consent of shipments of radioactive materials by sea.52
There is, however, a major flaw in this reasoning. The Basel Convention does not apply
to nuclear cargoes covered by other international agreements.53 Therefore, with regard to the
shipment of nuclear materials, the Basel Convention is preempted by two international
conventions, neither of which have requirements for notification or prior authorization: the
International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) 1993 Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated
Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships54 (INF

49

Van Dyke argues that UNCLOS article 221(1) in fact is a codification of the precautionary
principle. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 221(1). This article authorizes state parties to:
“take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual
threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from
pollution or threat of pollution following a maritime casualty or acts relating to such
casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.”
Id.
The “acts relating to such casualty” language has given Van Dyke reason to believe that this
language was intended to give states the right to deny passage to ships carrying ultra hazardous
materials contrary to the requirements of the precautionary principle. Van Dyke II, supra note 9,
at 105.
50
Basel Convention, supra note 8.
51
Id., at arts. 4(2)(f)&(h).
52
See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 382; See Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at note 66.
53
Id., at art. 1(3).
54
Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive
Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships, Res. 748, IMO, 18th Sess. (Nov. 4, 1993) [hereinafter INF
12

Code), amemded to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea55 (SOLAS) in
1999, and; the 1973 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and other Matter. 56
The precautionary principle has also been incorporated into two regional conventions: the
Organization of African Unity’s 1991 Bamako Convention57 and the 1995 Waigani
Convention58 between the Pacific island nations. Like the Basel Convention, both of these
regional conventions require an exporting state to get prior written consent from a transit state
party before passage of nuclear materials through their waters are deemed legal.59

These

conventions, however, are different with regard to how they treat the transport of nuclear
materials. The Bamako explicitly includes the transport of nuclear materials within its scope of
obligations.60 The Waigani Convention, however, only addresses radioactive materials with
regard to invoking a total ban on their import, export and dumping within the treaty area.61 The
convention also advises member states to adopt the regulations found in the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of

Code] available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/infcode1999.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2005).
55
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, as amended in
1981 and 1983 with the 1978 SOLAS Protocal, 32 UST 47, TIAS 9700, 14 I.L.M. 956 (1975)
[hereinafter SOLAS] available at
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=257&doc_id=647 (the IMO’s Marine
Science Committee and Marine Environment Protection Committee formally decided to add the
INF Code to this treaty in May 1999, taking effect in 2001).
56
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters,
Dec. 29, 1972, [1975], 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1294.
57
See Bamako Convention, supra note 8.
58
See Waigani Convention, supra note 8.
59
Bamako Convention, supra note 8 at art. 6; Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6.3.
60
Bamako Convention, supra note 8, at art. 2.2.
61
Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art 4.1 & 4.3.
13

Radioactive Wastes, which will be discussed in the next section.62 The acceptance of these
treaties by their member states does demonstrate state practice accepted as law. The small
number of states involved, however, does not rise to the level of opinio juris.63
ii. Soft law: resolutions, declarations, agendas, and draft articles
In 1990, the IAEA drafted a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste which incorporated aspects of the precautionary principle
including notice and prior authorization requirements for shipments of nuclear material.64 This
code makes bold statements with regard to coastal state’s rights to suspend innocent passage,
including:
“It is the sovereign right of every State to prohibit the movement of radioactive waste into, from
or through its territory,” and; “every state should take appropriate steps to ensure that, subject to
the relevant norms of international law, the international transboundary movement of radioactive
waste take place only with the prior notification and consent of the sending, receiving and transit
States in accordance with their respective laws and regulations.”65

62

Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art 4.5(a)
As of June 2004, there were twenty-one countries had become parties to the Bamako
Convention through either ratification or accession: Benin, Cameroon, Comoros, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d´Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania,
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe. See Basel Convention Regional Centre Pretoria, Status of
Ratifications, at http://www.baselpretoria.org.za/ratifications.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
As of December 2002, ten parties had ratified the Waigani Convention: Australia, Cook Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, Kirribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Island and
Tuvalu. See Austrsailian Department of Environment and Heratige, International Hazardous
Waste Conventions, at http://www.deh.gov.au/industry/chemicals/hwa/conventions.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2005).
64
IAEA, General Conference Resolution on Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste, Sept. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 556 (1991) available at
http://www.globelaw.com/Nukes/iaeacod.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
65
Id., at annex I, sec. 3.
63

14

This language, however, is qualified earlier in the code where it states that the code is
“advisory”66 and by a footnote that provides:
Nothing in this code prejudices or affects in any way the exercise by ships and aircraft of all
States and maritime and air navigation in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and under other relevant international legal instruments.67

It is important to note the specialized agency that regulates safety of transport of nuclear
materials by sea under UNCLOS is the IMO not the IAEA. In regulating shipments of nuclear
materials by sea, the IMO does incorporate IAEA conventions and most of their regulations.
The IMO, however, has not incorporated the IAEA Code of Practice on the International
Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, but instead follows the INF Code to regulate
nuclear shipments by sea.
Many believe that the genesis of the precautionary principle as an international custom
began at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de
Janeiro.68 The Rio conference indeed was a groundbreaking event for the advancement of the
precautionary principle. There, 172 state participants69 unanimously agreed to a Declaration on
Environment and Development with an implementation agenda, Agenda 21, to put into action
the Declaration’s principles.70

The Rio Declaration’s principles set out a framework for

66

Id., at annex I, sec. 1.
Id., at n.2.
68
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, G.A. Res. 228, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1992).
69
See United Nations Earth Summit information website, at
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (last visited on Nov. 11, 2005).
70
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] available at
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/pdf/RIO_E.PDF (last visited Nov. 11,
67
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economic development and environmental protection that states are called upon to adopt into
their domestic legislation.

Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration calls for the use of a

“precautionary approach” where there are “threats” to the environment, stating:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.71

Agenda 21 further provides more specific policy recommendations with regard to taking
precautionary approaches to “prevent” degradation of the marine environment:
States, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
on protection and preservation of the marine environment, commit themselves, in accordance with
their policies, priorities and resources, to prevent, reduce and control degradation of the marine
environment so as to maintain and improve its life-support and productive capacities. To this end, it
is necessary to … [a]pply preventive, precautionary and anticipatory approaches so as to avoid
degradation of the marine environment, as well as to reduce the risk of long-term or irreversible
adverse effects upon it.72

Furthermore, the International Law Commission (ILC) has included the precautionary
principle in its 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities.73 The Draft Articles have requirements for prior authorization,74 risk assessments,75

2005); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, ch 17.22(a),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21] available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=52 (last visited on Nov. 11, 2005).
71
Rio Declaration, supra note 70, at Principle 15.
72
Agenda 21, supra note 70, at ch. 17.22(a).
73
Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report of
the Int’l Law Comm., U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, chp.V.E.1
[hereinafter Draft Articles] available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/prevention_articles(e).pdf (last visited Nov. 11,
2005).
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notification,76 and consultation.77 It is important to note, however, that the Draft Article also
have a provision for withholding information for “national security” reasons.78

This later

provision quite possibly will be an opt out provision for countries transporting nuclear materials
who have steadfastly maintained that their shipments require secrecy for security reasons.79
Since one of the ILC’s main duties is to codify customary international law,80 the existence of
these draft articles reinforces the claim that the precautionary principle is in fact international
custom. Due to the relative novelty of transport of nuclear materials, however, these draft
articles most likely are a representation the ILC’s other mandate: to progressively develop
international law.81
Though the above agreements are a significant step towards the development of an
international customary law of precaution, they are not binding international law since they are
not in the form of a convention or treaty. Despite the fact that conference declarations, agendas
and recommendations are not binding international law, they are “soft-law.”

They are

agreements made by the conference participants or international organizations that encourage
countries to work in good faith towards the implementation of the goals of the agreements.
Countries therefore are at liberty to enact the principles into their domestic laws, thus
making them binding within their own jurisdictions. If parties to these agreements ignore their
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obligations, however, there is no penalty for a breach of a soft-law regime. Furthermore, these
agreements by themselves are not evidence of an international custom since they are not legally
binding. International customary law can only be found when there is a general practice of states
accepted as law.82 Though the precautionary principle may not currently represent international
customary law, it seems to be an area of “developing custom.”83
4. Safeguards for Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Materials
The current safeguard regime for transporting nuclear materials on board ships is derived
from a matrix of treaties and regulations developed and administered by the IAEA and IMO.
a. IAEA Safeguards
IAEA instruments cover the security of nuclear cargoes and the safety of packages
containing nuclear materials.84 The origin of the IAEA’s nuclear safeguard regime is found in
article 3 of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).85 Article 3
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North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, para.77 (Feb. 20,
1969); Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153,
art. 38(1)(b).
83
See generally John M. Macdonald, Appreciating the Precautionary Principle as an Ethical
Evolution in Ocean Management, 26 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 255, 255-56, 262-263 (1995).
84
Alan E. Boyle, Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective, 30
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 257, at 261-66 (1989) [hereinafter Boyle] (discussing IAEA's function to
ensure health and safety in every aspect of the use of nuclear energy).
85
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. 3, 21 UST 483, 729
UNTS 169 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) available at
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
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requires each state party “to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the [… IAEA’s] safeguards system.”86
Though NPT article 3 generally contemplates bilateral inspection and confirmation
agreements, it also requires compliance with multilateral safeguard agreements.

The 1979

Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material imposes the duty to safeguard radioactive
materials loaded on vessels.87 Article 3 of the physical protection convention provides:
“Each State Party shall take appropriate steps … consistent with international law to
ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport … on board a ship
or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport
to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I.”88
Annex I provides requirements for physical protection of Category I89 nuclear material during
transport. These include:
“prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior agreement between
natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of exporting and
importing States, specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport
responsibility; … [shipment must be] under constant surveillance by escorts and under
conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces.”90
The physical protection convention, however, does not require prior notification to or
authorization from transit states during their voyage. Article 6 provides that:
86

Id. Though article 3 only explicitly requires non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to submit to
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89
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“States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which
they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would
jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear
material.”91
Another IAEA convention which touches the issue of safeguards for transport of nuclear
materials is the 1997 Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management.92 Providing the only guidance on the subject, article 27 of the
convention provides: “transboundary movement through states of transit shall be subject to those
international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transportation utilized.”
In addition to the above conventions, the IAEA also provides non-mandatory
recommendations for the safeguarding transboundary shipments of nuclear material. The first of
these is the above mentioned IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste.93 Though this code provides that every state has the right to
deny passage to shipments of nuclear materials, it later states that the code is subject to the rules
of the UNCLOS and customary international law. As discussed above in Section Three, these
two statements are mutually exclusive.
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Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6(2).
Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management, Sept. 5, 1997, available at
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Lastly, IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material provide detailed
standards for packaging and shipping requirements in the transportation of radioactive
materials.94 It establishes a complicated bilateral and multilateral approval system to determine
which shipments of nuclear materials require prior authorization from transport states.95 Though
these regulations do require prior notification and authorization for shipments of fissile material
over a specified indexed amount, the standards for ocean shipments are much less strict than land
shipments,96 and have many exceptions including the common national security exception.97
b. IMO Safeguards
The IMO regulations that deal with the transport of ultra-hazardous materials on ocean
going vessels are found in the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code).98
Within the IMDG Code are regulations that specifically deal with the transport of nuclear
materials: the INF Code.99

Both of these codes are now mandatory and are found as

amendments to the SOLAS convention.100

94

IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1 (ST-1, Revised
1996) available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1225_web.pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2005).
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Id., at annex I.
96
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The INF Code incorporates many of the above IAEA regulations and provides madatory
safety regualtions for the shipment of nuclear materials. Its primarily concern is the packaging
of radioactive materials and the construction, design, and staffing of the ships that transport
them. The INF Code does not, however, address notification or approval of coastal states of
shipments or emergency response plans, though these topics are being considered for
adoption.101 Several commentators have expressed concern that the INF Code’s reliance on
design and packaging safeguards are not sufficient for the dangers these cargos present to coastal
states.102
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
With regard to all things related to the ocean, UNCLOS is nearly universally considered
the controlling body of law. It is for this reason that the convention is often referred to as “the
constitution for the oceans”103 In this section, however, we will limit scope of the discussion to
the laws regulating the right of innocent passage, including those specifically for ships
transporting nuclear materials, and the coastal state’s right to protect their marine environment.
To begin with, it is important to note that “innocent passage” is somewhat different than
“freedom of navigation” as defined in article 87 (freedom of navigation on the high seas) and
101

IMO, Main Conclusions of the Second Session of the Joint IAEA/IMO/UNEP Working Group
on the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel (INF) at Sea (26 – 30 April 1993), IMO
Secretariat Note to the 62nd Sess. of the Maritime Safety Committee, Doc. MSC 62/16/1 (1993)
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12, 2005).
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article 56 (freedom of navigation in the EEZ - which incorporates the definition of article 87).104
Freedom of navigation on the high seas is one of the oldest and fundamental principles of
customary international law.105 Ships on the high seas have exclusive jurisdiction over their
vessel and crew and thus their passage can not be suspended, except in certain limited
circumstances where warships have the right to board vessels.106
The right to freedom of navigation in the EEZ becomes somewhat murky, however, since
these ships “shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State” with regard
to environmental protection.107 Therefore, within the EEZ there is somewhat of a jurisdictional
conflict between a foreign-flag vessel’s freedom of navigation and a coastal state’s
environmental concerns.

Article 59 states that these conflicts should be resolved through

principles of equity.108 Nonetheless, it is without question that the right of ships to exercise
freedom of navigation within the EEZ is no less than their right to innocent passage within a
coastal state’s territorial waters. Thus, it is important to understand the law of innocent passage
and circumstances when coastal states can deny this passage.
a. Innocent Passage
The right of innocent passage is articulated in article 17, stating, “subject to this
Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent

104
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passage.”109 Article 19 defines “innocent passage” by stating that passage is innocent so long as
“it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”110 Furthermore,
article 24 clearly sets out that coastal states are not to hamper the right of innocent passage,
providing coastal states “shall not … impose requirements on foreign ships which have the
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or … discriminate in form
or in fact against the ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of
any State.”111
The language in article 24 seems to be unequivocal. Article 25, however, provides that
coastal states have the right to take measures to protect their coastline “to prevent passage which
is not innocent.”112 Article 19 lays out a list of activities where passage of a foreign ship shall be
considered non-innocent, of which the only mention of environmental concern is a provision
making passage non-innocent for “any act of willful and serious pollution.”113 Seemingly, there
is a presumption that peaceful shipping of nuclear materials would be considered an exercise of
innocent passage as long as the intent to voyage was not to cause serious pollution.
Under article 25, however, a coastal state may “suspend temporarily in specified areas of
its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the
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protection of its security,” and only after such suspension has been “duly published.”114 The
qualifying language “in specified areas” in this article seems to contemplate limited zones of
special environmental concern, or areas of military concern, and does not seem to provide a
blanket right for coastal states to suspend innocent passage from the entire territorial sea as was
seen in the controversies in part 2 of this paper.
Most relevant to the topic of this paper are the articles that specifically deal with ships
carrying nuclear materials: articles 22 and 23. Article 22 provides that coastal states may require
ships carrying nuclear materials to use “sea lanes and traffic separation schemes” when
exercising the right of innocent passage through their territorial seas.115 It does not, however,
allow coastal states to suspend innocent passage for these ships. Article 23 states that “ships
carrying nuclear … substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage … carry
documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by
international agreements.”116 (Emphasis added.)
Presumptively, under the provisions of article 23, as long a ship follows the “special
precautionary measures” coastal states can not deny innocent passage. But what are these
“special precautionary measures” and which “international agreements” does this article refer to?
This language might suggest hope for the advocates of the precautionary principle in that they
may contemplate international agreements incorporating it. This, however, is not the case. The
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language “international agreements” in article 23, is a term of art specifically contemplating IMO
agreements, and most importantly the INF Code.117
b. Protection of the marine environment
Part XII of UNCLOS deals with the protection of the marine environment. Article 194
provides that states shall take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment from any source.”118 Paragraph four of this article, however, conditions
this right by providing that “States shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities
carried out by other States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in
conformity with this Convention.”119
Article 211 addresses the specific issue of measures to prevent pollution from vessels,
providing:
“States, acting through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference,
shall establish international rules and standards to prevent … pollution of the marine environment
from vessels and promote the adoption, in the same manner, wherever appropriate, of routeing
systems designed to minimize the threat of accidents which might cause pollution.”120

In this provision, however, we once again find qualifying language stating that coastal states
shall “not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.”121 Notice that this article does not
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provide that coastal states themselves may establish rules regarding prevention of vessel
pollution, but instead specifically requires states to act “through the competent international
organization or general diplomatic conference.” This language is a term of art and specifically

contemplates states working multilaterally through the IMO to establish such rules and
standards.122

Thus, one can presume that any enactment of the precautionary principle in

domestic laws, as contemplated in Section Three of this paper, would be suspect under this
provision.
Article 221 gives coastal states enforcement mechanisms to avoid pollution arising from
maritime casualties. It provides:
“Nothing in [Part XII] shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests,
including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts
relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful
consequences.”123 (Emphasis added.)

This article provides the most concrete example yet of a justification within UNCLOS of a
coastal state to use measures to prevent a ship carrying nuclear materials from coming within its
territorial waters or EEZ. Notice that authority for state action under this article is justified under
both customary and conventional international law. What is meant by customary law here?
Some scholars have suggested that this language is in reference to earlier conventions on
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intervention on the high seas which use similar language as that found in article 221, and have
achieved customary status.124
For example, after the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas125 was negotiated, a 1973 protocol was adopted relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil.126 Article 1 of this protocol
authorizes coastal states to protect coastal marine resources by taking any necessary measures on
the high seas to prevent or mitigate “grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related
interests from pollution or threat of pollution by substances other than oil following upon a
maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result
in harmful consequences.”127 (Emphasis added.)
Notice also that article 221 deals with both actual or “threatened damage” by maritime
casualty “or acts relating to such a casualty.” Commentators such as Van Dyke have suggested
that this article give coastal states flexibility to prevent ultra-hazardous materials from passing
through their waters without certain precautions. Van Dyke writes:
Concerned coastal nations might view “acts relating to such a casualty” as including foreseeable
risks created by shipments of ultrahazardous cargoes without proper advance consultation,
creation of emergency contingency plans, and liability regimes, and hence might view this
provision as authorizing intervention to block such shipments. If nations with flag state
jurisdiction do not fulfill their obligations to “take adequate steps to control and regulate sources
124
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of serious environmental pollution or transboundary harm within their territory or subject to their
jurisdiction,” then nations threatened by such lack of protective action will inevitably act to
protect their threatened coastal resources.128

Lastly, the discussion in Section Two of this paper described the 1995 controversy of the
voyage of the Pacific Pintail, in which it was stated that the Chilean Maritime Authority cited
the precautionary principle as justification for denying the ship passage.129 According to Van
Dyke, the Chilean Maritime Authority also cited UNCLOS article 234.130 This article states:
“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for
the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within
the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional
hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.”131

Article 234 provides strong support for coastal states to deny the right of innocent passage in
these ice-covered areas. Thus, this is one of the very few exceptions to the general rule that
states can not deny the right of innocent passage.
In summary, one can glean from the above UNCLOS provisions that despite the fact that
coastal states have the right to take measures to protect their marine environment, this right
generally does not supersede the right of foreign flag state vessels to exercise innocent passage
though coastal state territorial waters or freedom of navigation within their EEZ.

This
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determination is supported by the writings of many scholars of the subject.132

The only

exceptions to this right would seem to be if the ships passage was in fact non-innocent by
intending to seriously pollute the waters of a coastal state, or if the ship was in violation of IMO
regulations with regard to the storage and transport of nuclear materials, or if it posed an
environmental threat to an ice-covered area. There is an interesting debate regarding Article
221’s customary rights to take measures in the case of maritime “casualty or acts related to such
a casualty.” The language of this article, however, provides that states can only take measures
against such ships if they are “reasonably … expected to result in major harmful consequences.”
Thus, if a ship has satisfied the inspection regime of the IMO with regard to the transport of
nuclear materials it most likely would not be reasonable to “expect” harmful consequences, even
though a possibility of such consequences may exist.
6. Discussion
From the above analysis of the precautionary principle, IAEA and IMO safeguards
regime, and the UNCLOS provisions on innocent passage and environmental protection, is it
clear that there is a clash of international law doctrines. It would be difficult to argue that at this
stage of development of the precautionary principle that its requirements are customary law or
that they supersede UNCLOS or IMO regulation on the transport of nuclear materials at sea.
Never the less, there is still the problem of state practice. There are more than a handful of states
that prohibit the passage of these ships. Therefore, this last section will discus how this dispute
can be equitably resolved.
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To begin with, Jon Van Dyke, has provided a wellspring of valid suggestions for the
international community to resolve this issue. His most pragmatic solution is for the IMO to
adopt precautionary principles in the INF Code.133 This solution is consistent with the procedure
set out in UNCLOS article 211 where coastal states would work through the IMO (“the
competent international organization or general diplomatic conference”) to create new
international rules for protecting the marine environment from the harm of ships. The positive
aspect of this recommendation is that it is the method for changing the rules recommended by
UNCOLS, and if (or when) the requirements of the precautionary principle are incorporated into
the INF Code they become mandatory regulations. This would at one time change the rules for
everyone in the shipping community, and thus would be a very efficient solution. The drawback
of this approach is that change at an international organization is slow. Van Dyke made this
recommendation in 1996, nearly 10 years ago, yet little progress has been made at the IMO to
incorporate the precautionary principle.
Van Dykes second proposal is to create regional regimes to enforce the precautionary
principle.134 This is an interesting option since this is what in fact is taking place as has been
seen in the Bamako and Waigani Conventions and from the actions of the Caribbean nations in
their declaration of a nuclear-free zone.

The drawback to this approach is that it creates

conflicting bodies of international laws and standards. This conflict would not only be between
UNCLOS/IMO and the regional regimes, but would also be between the regional regimes
themselves.

This can already be seen in the different standards between the Bamako and

Waigani Conventions with regard to nuclear materials. Carried to its logical end, this solution
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would lead to inefficiencies in the shipping community which would have to comply with each
of the different regimes’ rules as well as the IMO regulations. Furthermore, it is conceivable to
suspect that this solution would lead to more legal (or actual) conflict between shipping and
coastal states, not less.
Van Dyke also provides a third recommendation: coastal states should bring a case
against the states shipping nuclear materials in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS).135 This would be the most efficient solution for resolving the currently conflicting
laws in that it would bring about the most clarity in the least amount of time. It could also be a
double edged sward for proponents of the precautionary principle. One can imagine the judges
ruling in favor of the laws as set out in UNCLOS and the INF Code since they are the more
established and clearer standards of international law. On the other hand, ITLOS could use its
equity power to require the IMO to adopt the precautionary principle in order to calm the valid
security concerns of coastal states and end the controversy once and for all.
Another interesting suggestion is the creation of a “universal sea lane” for the shipment
of nuclear materials.136 This solution would maintain the status quo regarding the lack of clarity
in international law, but would also create an interim option to facilitate shipping while allowing
coastal states to prohibit passage. Though this is a novel idea, in practice it would seem to be a
difficult undertaking to negotiate such an agreement between shipping and coastal states. To
begin with, where would this sea lane be located? Coastal states would likely all have the same
opinion for such an agreement: we support it as long as the route doesn’t pass through our
135
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waters. This ‘not in my back yard’ mentality would likely stall such an agreement indefinitely.
Furthermore, shipping states would most likely be wary of such an idea because of their interest
in secrecy and unpredictability to protect national security. The use of a single sea lane would
conceivably create predictable patterns of transport that could be exploited by pirates and/or
terrorists groups.
7. Conclusion
In light of the recent controversies in the international shipping of nuclear materials, and
upon reviewing the divergent hard and soft international law within this area, it is clear that there
is a conflict between the quickly evolving field of international environmental law and the
established system surrounding the international law of the sea. How to solve this problem,
however, is not clear at present. The existing nuclear safeguards and law of the sea regimes
provides binding legal provisions and a system of regulation for the shipment of nuclear
materials. Furthermore, it seems apparent that the denial of the right of innocent passage by
coastal states to ships carrying nuclear material is, except in limited circumstances, in violation
of the existing law of the sea regime.
It also seems apparent, however, that the drafters of UNCLOS may not have foreseen the
scale shipments would ultimately take or the potential danger that they pose. The tremendous
amount of damage that would occur in the event that a ship like the Pacific Pintail were to be
involved in a terrorist attack or major accident with radioactive effect is almost beyond
imagination. In today’s energy starved world, however, these shipments are most likely going to
be a permanent part of the landscape of international shipping, and thus will have to be dealt with
in a safe and effective manner.
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The requirements of the precautionary principle seem to be a sensible way to ensure the
safety of nuclear shipments in the future, though opponents would likely argue that they would
create inefficiencies. If the precautionary principle is indeed a “developing custom,” it is only a
matter of time before these requirements will become standard practice. Therefore, it may be in
the best interests of shipping states to embrace the requirements of the precautionary principle
now and find ways to overcome the inefficiencies. If shipping states wait until being forced to
comply with the requirements down the road, it will only come at greater expense.
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